Implements defense-in-depth security for HIPAA and multi-tenant requirements:
**Phase 1 - File Ingestion Security:**
- SecurePathValidator with symlink resolution and path boundary enforcement
in internal/fileutil/secure.go
- Magic bytes validation for ML artifacts (safetensors, GGUF, HDF5, numpy)
in internal/fileutil/filetype.go
- Dangerous extension blocking (.pt, .pkl, .exe, .sh, .zip)
- Upload limits (10GB size, 100MB/s rate, 10 uploads/min)
**Phase 2 - Sandbox Hardening:**
- ApplySecurityDefaults() with secure-by-default principle
- network_mode: none, read_only_root: true, no_new_privileges: true
- drop_all_caps: true, user_ns: true, run_as_uid/gid: 1000
- PodmanSecurityConfig and BuildSecurityArgs() in internal/container/podman.go
- BuildPodmanCommand now accepts full security configuration
- Container executor passes SandboxConfig to Podman command builder
- configs/seccomp/default-hardened.json blocks dangerous syscalls
(ptrace, mount, reboot, kexec_load, open_by_handle_at)
**Phase 3 - Secrets Management:**
- expandSecrets() for environment variable expansion using ${VAR} syntax
- validateNoPlaintextSecrets() with entropy-based detection
- Pattern matching for AWS, GitHub, GitLab, OpenAI, Stripe tokens
- Shannon entropy calculation (>4 bits/char triggers detection)
- Secrets expanded during LoadConfig() before validation
**Phase 5 - HIPAA Audit Logging:**
- Tamper-evident chain hashing with SHA-256 in internal/audit/audit.go
- Event struct extended with PrevHash, EventHash, SequenceNum
- File access event types: EventFileRead, EventFileWrite, EventFileDelete
- LogFileAccess() helper for HIPAA compliance
- VerifyChain() function for tamper detection
**Supporting Changes:**
- Add DeleteJob() and DeleteJobsByPrefix() to storage package
- Integrate SecurePathValidator in artifact scanning
124 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
124 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
package worker
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import (
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"fmt"
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"io/fs"
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"path/filepath"
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"sort"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/jfraeys/fetch_ml/internal/fileutil"
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"github.com/jfraeys/fetch_ml/internal/manifest"
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)
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func scanArtifacts(runDir string, includeAll bool) (*manifest.Artifacts, error) {
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runDir = strings.TrimSpace(runDir)
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if runDir == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("run dir is empty")
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}
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// Validate and canonicalize the runDir before any operations
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validator := fileutil.NewSecurePathValidator(runDir)
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validatedRunDir, err := validator.ValidatePath("")
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid run directory: %w", err)
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}
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var files []manifest.ArtifactFile
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var total int64
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now := time.Now().UTC()
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err = filepath.WalkDir(validatedRunDir, func(path string, d fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if path == validatedRunDir {
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return nil
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}
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// Security: Validate each path is still within runDir
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// This catches any symlink escapes or path traversal attempts during walk
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rel, err := filepath.Rel(validatedRunDir, path)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("path escape detected during artifact scan: %w", err)
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}
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rel = filepath.ToSlash(rel)
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// Check for path traversal patterns in the relative path
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if strings.Contains(rel, "..") {
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return fmt.Errorf("path traversal attempt detected: %s", rel)
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}
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// Standard exclusions (always apply)
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if rel == manifestFilename {
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return nil
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}
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if strings.HasSuffix(rel, "/"+manifestFilename) {
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return nil
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}
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// Optional exclusions (skipped when includeAll is true)
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if !includeAll {
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if rel == "code" || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "code/") {
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if d.IsDir() {
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return fs.SkipDir
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}
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return nil
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}
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if rel == "snapshot" || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "snapshot/") {
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if d.IsDir() {
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return fs.SkipDir
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}
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return nil
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}
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if strings.HasSuffix(rel, ".log") {
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return nil
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}
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if d.Type()&fs.ModeSymlink != 0 {
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// Skip symlinks - they could point outside the directory
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return nil
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}
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}
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if d.IsDir() {
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return nil
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}
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info, err := d.Info()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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files = append(files, manifest.ArtifactFile{
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Path: rel,
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SizeBytes: info.Size(),
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Modified: info.ModTime().UTC(),
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})
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total += info.Size()
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return nil
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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sort.Slice(files, func(i, j int) bool {
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return files[i].Path < files[j].Path
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})
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return &manifest.Artifacts{
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DiscoveryTime: now,
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Files: files,
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TotalSizeBytes: total,
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}, nil
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}
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const manifestFilename = "run_manifest.json"
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// ScanArtifacts is an exported wrapper for testing/benchmarking.
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// When includeAll is false, excludes code/, snapshot/, *.log files, and symlinks.
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func ScanArtifacts(runDir string, includeAll bool) (*manifest.Artifacts, error) {
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return scanArtifacts(runDir, includeAll)
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}
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