7efe8bbfbf
Security Fixes: - CVE-2024-45339: Add O_EXCL flag to temp file creation in storage_write_entries() Prevents symlink attacks on predictable .tmp file paths - CVE-2025-47290: Use openat_nofollow() in storage_open() Closes TOCTOU race condition via path_sanitizer infrastructure - CVE-2025-0838: Add MAX_BATCH_SIZE=10000 to add_tasks() Prevents integer overflow in batch operations Research Trustworthiness (dataset_hash): - Deterministic file ordering: std::sort after collect_files() - Recursive directory traversal: depth-limited with cycle detection - Documented exclusions: hidden files and special files noted in API Bug Fixes: - R1: storage_init path validation for non-existent directories - R2: safe_strncpy return value check before strcat - R3: parallel_hash 256-file cap replaced with std::vector - R4: wire qi_compact_index/qi_rebuild_index stubs - R5: CompletionLatch race condition fix (hold mutex during decrement) - R6: ARMv8 SHA256 transform fix (save abcd_pre before vsha256hq_u32) - R7: fuzz_index_storage header format fix - R8: enforce null termination in add_tasks/update_tasks - R9: use 64 bytes (not 65) in combined hash to exclude null terminator - R10: status field persistence in save() New Tests: - test_recursive_dataset.cpp: Verify deterministic recursive hashing - test_storage_symlink_resistance.cpp: Verify CVE-2024-45339 fix - test_queue_index_batch_limit.cpp: Verify CVE-2025-0838 fix - test_sha256_arm_kat.cpp: ARMv8 known-answer tests - test_storage_init_new_dir.cpp: F1 verification - test_parallel_hash_large_dir.cpp: F3 verification - test_queue_index_compact.cpp: F4 verification All 8 native tests passing. Library ready for research lab deployment.
21 lines
754 B
C++
21 lines
754 B
C++
#pragma once
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#include <cstddef>
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namespace fetchml::common {
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// Canonicalize and validate a path
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// - Uses realpath() to resolve symlinks and normalize
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// - Checks that the canonical path doesn't contain ".." traversal
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// - out_canonical must be at least PATH_MAX bytes
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// Returns true if path is safe, false otherwise
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bool canonicalize_and_validate(const char* path, char* out_canonical, size_t out_size);
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// Open a directory with O_NOFOLLOW to prevent symlink attacks
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// Returns fd or -1 on error
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int open_dir_nofollow(const char* path);
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// Open a file relative to a directory fd using openat()
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// Uses O_NOFOLLOW to prevent symlink attacks
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int openat_nofollow(int dir_fd, const char* filename, int flags, int mode);
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} // namespace fetchml::common
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