# Multi-Tenant Security Implementation Summary ## Overview This document summarizes the Multi-Tenant Server Security features implemented for tenant isolation, cross-tenant access prevention, resource quotas, worker sanitization, and per-tenant audit logging. --- ## Tenant Isolation ### Tenant Manager (`internal/worker/tenant/manager.go`) **Core Types:** - `Tenant` - Represents an isolated tenant with metadata, config, and lifecycle state - `TenantConfig` - Holds tenant-specific configuration including quotas and security policies - `IsolationLevel` - Defines isolation degree: `soft`, `hard`, or `dedicated` **Key Methods:** - `CreateTenant()` - Creates isolated tenant workspace with subdirectories (artifacts, snapshots, logs, cache) - `GetTenant()` - Retrieves active tenant by ID - `DeactivateTenant()` - Soft-delete tenant - `GetTenantWorkspace()` - Returns isolated workspace path for tenant - `ListTenants()` - Returns all active tenants **Workspace Isolation:** ``` /tenants/ ├── {tenant-id}/ │ ├── artifacts/ │ ├── snapshots/ │ ├── logs/ │ └── cache/ ``` **Security Defaults (`DefaultTenantConfig`):** - IsolationLevel: `hard` (container-level) - RequireEncryption: true - RequireAuditLogging: true - RequireSandbox: true - NetworkPolicy: "restricted" --- ## Cross-Tenant Access Prevention ### Middleware (`internal/worker/tenant/middleware.go`) **HTTP Middleware:** - `Middleware.Handler()` - Validates tenant ID from headers/query params/context - `ExtractTenantID()` - Extracts tenant ID from request (header: `X-Tenant-ID`, query param, or context) - Automatic audit logging of all tenant requests **Resource Access Control:** - `ResourceAccessChecker` - Validates cross-tenant resource access - `CheckAccess()` - Denies all cross-tenant access by default - `CheckResourceOwnership()` - Validates resource belongs to requesting tenant - `ValidateResourcePath()` - Ensures path within tenant workspace **Cross-Tenant Denial:** ```go // All cross-tenant access denied by default if requestingTenantID != resourceTenantID { return fmt.Errorf("cross-tenant access denied") } ``` --- ## Resource Quotas per Tenant ### Quota Manager (`internal/worker/tenant/quota.go`) **ResourceQuota Structure:** - MaxConcurrentJobs - Job concurrency limit - MaxGPUs - GPU allocation limit - MaxMemoryGB - Memory usage limit - MaxStorageGB - Storage quota - MaxCPUCores - CPU core limit - MaxRuntimeHours - Maximum job runtime - MaxArtifactsPerHour - Artifact creation rate limit **QuotaManager Features:** - `CheckQuota()` - Validates resource request against tenant limits - `Allocate()` - Reserves resources for tenant - `Release()` - Frees resources when done - `RecordArtifact()` - Tracks artifact creation rate - Automatic hourly counter reset **Default Quotas:** ```go MaxConcurrentJobs: 5 MaxGPUs: 1 MaxMemoryGB: 32 MaxStorageGB: 100 MaxCPUCores: 8 MaxRuntimeHours: 24 MaxArtifactsPerHour: 10 ``` --- ## Worker Sanitization Between Tenants ### Sanitization (`internal/worker/tenant/manager.go`) **SanitizeForTenant():** - Clears tenant-specific caches - Logs tenant transition for audit - Prepares worker environment for different tenant **Called When:** - Worker switches between tenant tasks - New tenant session begins **Audit Event:** `AuditWorkerSanitized` --- ## Per-Tenant Audit Logging ### Audit Logger (`internal/worker/tenant/quota.go`) **AuditEvent Types:** - `AuditTenantCreated` - Tenant provisioned - `AuditTenantDeactivated` - Tenant deactivated - `AuditTenantUpdated` - Configuration changed - `AuditResourceAccess` - Resource accessed - `AuditResourceCreated` - Resource created - `AuditResourceDeleted` - Resource deleted - `AuditJobSubmitted` - Job queued - `AuditJobCompleted` - Job finished - `AuditJobFailed` - Job error - `AuditCrossTenantDeny` - Cross-tenant blocked - `AuditQuotaExceeded` - Quota violation - `AuditWorkerSanitized` - Worker cleaned - `AuditEncryptionOp` - Encryption operation - `AuditDecryptionOp` - Decryption operation **Audit Log Structure:** ``` /tenants/ └── {tenant-id}/ └── audit.log (JSON format) ``` **Features:** - Per-tenant isolated log files - Structured JSON format - IP address tracking - Success/failure status - Detailed context in `Details` field --- ## Files Created ### Core Implementation 1. `internal/worker/tenant/manager.go` - Tenant lifecycle and isolation 2. `internal/worker/tenant/quota.go` - Resource quotas and audit logging 3. `internal/worker/tenant/middleware.go` - HTTP middleware and access control ### Worker Integration 4. `internal/worker/worker.go` - Added `TenantManager` field to Worker struct --- ## Testing Build verification: ```bash make dev # Successful ``` All Go packages compile on: - macOS (Darwin) - Linux - Windows --- ## Security Impact | Feature | Threat Mitigated | Implementation | |---------|------------------|----------------| | Tenant Isolation | Data leakage between tenants | Hard isolation with dedicated workspaces | | Cross-Tenant Access | Unauthorized data access | Deny-by-default with audit logging | | Resource Quotas | Resource exhaustion / DoS | Per-tenant limits with enforcement | | Worker Sanitization | Cross-contamination | State clearing between tenant switches | | Per-Tenant Audit | Compliance gaps | Isolated audit logs per tenant | --- ## HIPAA Compliance All features support HIPAA compliance: - Tenant isolation ensures data separation - Cross-tenant access prevention blocks unauthorized access - Per-tenant audit logs enable compliance tracking - Resource quotas prevent resource-based DoS --- ## Integration Points **Worker Usage:** ```go // Initialize tenant manager w.TenantManager, _ = tenant.NewManager("/tenants", w.Logger) // Create tenant tenant, _ := w.TenantManager.CreateTenant(ctx, "tenant-1", "Acme Corp", config) // Validate resource access err := w.TenantManager.ValidateTenantAccess(ctx, requestingTenant, resourceTenant) // Sanitize between tenants w.TenantManager.SanitizeForTenant(ctx, newTenantID) ``` **HTTP Middleware Usage:** ```go middleware := tenant.NewMiddleware(tenantManager, logger) http.Handle("/api/", middleware.Handler(apiHandler)) ```