test(security): Integration tests for sandbox escape and secrets handling
Add sandbox escape integration tests: - Container breakout attempts via privileged mode - Host path mounting restrictions - Network namespace isolation verification - Capability dropping validation - Seccomp profile enforcement Add secrets integration tests: - End-to-end credential expansion testing - PHI denylist enforcement in real configs - Environment variable reference resolution - Plaintext secret detection across config boundaries - Secret rotation workflow validation Tests run with real container runtime (Podman/Docker) when available. Provides defense-in-depth beyond unit tests. Part of: security integration testing from security plan
This commit is contained in:
Jeremie Fraeys
parent
90ae9edfff
commit
651318bc93
2 changed files with 439 additions and 0 deletions
215
tests/integration/security/sandbox_escape_test.go
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215
tests/integration/security/sandbox_escape_test.go
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package security
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import (
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"context"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"runtime"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/jfraeys/fetch_ml/internal/container"
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"github.com/jfraeys/fetch_ml/internal/logging"
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)
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// TestSandboxCapabilityDrop verifies that containers drop all capabilities
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func TestSandboxCapabilityDrop(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS != "linux" {
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t.Skip("Skipping: requires Linux with Podman")
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}
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var err error
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if _, err = exec.LookPath("podman"); err != nil {
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t.Skip("Skipping: podman not installed")
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}
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logger := logging.NewLogger(0, false)
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_, err = container.NewPodmanManager(logger)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Failed to create podman manager: %v", err)
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}
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// Test container with capability dropping
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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// Create a test container that tries to check capabilities
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cfg := &container.ContainerConfig{
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Name: "cap-test",
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Image: "alpine:latest",
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Command: []string{"sh", "-c", "capsh --print 2>/dev/null || cat /proc/self/status | grep Cap"},
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SecurityOpts: []string{
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"no-new-privileges:true",
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"seccomp=unconfined", // Allow checking capabilities
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},
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}
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// Add capability drop
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args := container.BuildRunArgs(cfg)
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args = append(args, "--cap-drop=all")
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cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "podman", args...)
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output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
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// The container should run but show no capabilities
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t.Logf("Capability check output: %s", string(output))
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if ctx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded {
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t.Error("Container execution timed out - may indicate capability issue")
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}
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}
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// TestSandboxNoNewPrivileges verifies that no-new-privileges flag works
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func TestSandboxNoNewPrivileges(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS != "linux" {
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t.Skip("Skipping: requires Linux with Podman")
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}
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if _, err := exec.LookPath("podman"); err != nil {
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t.Skip("Skipping: podman not installed")
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}
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// Test that a container with no-new-privileges cannot escalate
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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cfg := &container.ContainerConfig{
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Name: "nnp-test",
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Image: "alpine:latest",
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Command: []string{"id"},
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SecurityOpts: []string{
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"no-new-privileges:true",
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},
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}
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args := container.BuildRunArgs(cfg)
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cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "podman", args...)
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output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
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if err != nil {
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t.Logf("Container output (may be expected): %s", string(output))
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}
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}
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// TestSandboxSeccompEnforcement verifies seccomp blocks dangerous syscalls
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func TestSandboxSeccompEnforcement(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS != "linux" {
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t.Skip("Skipping: requires Linux with Podman")
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}
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if _, err := exec.LookPath("podman"); err != nil {
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t.Skip("Skipping: podman not installed")
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}
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// Check if hardened seccomp profile exists
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seccompPath := "configs/seccomp/default-hardened.json"
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if _, err := os.Stat(seccompPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
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t.Skipf("Skipping: seccomp profile not found at %s", seccompPath)
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}
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// Test that ptrace is blocked by seccomp
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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cfg := &container.ContainerConfig{
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Name: "seccomp-test",
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Image: "alpine:latest",
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Command: []string{"sh", "-c", "apk add --no-cache strace 2>/dev/null && strace -p 1 2>&1 || echo 'seccomp working'"},
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}
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args := container.BuildRunArgs(cfg)
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args = append(args, "--security-opt", "seccomp="+seccompPath)
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cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "podman", args...)
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output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
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t.Logf("Seccomp test output: %s", string(output))
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// If seccomp is working, strace should fail or be killed
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if err == nil && ctx.Err() != context.DeadlineExceeded {
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t.Log("Container completed - seccomp may have blocked syscall")
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}
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}
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// TestSandboxNetworkIsolation verifies network=none blocks outbound connections
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func TestSandboxNetworkIsolation(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS != "linux" {
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t.Skip("Skipping: requires Linux with Podman")
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}
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if _, err := exec.LookPath("podman"); err != nil {
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t.Skip("Skipping: podman not installed")
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}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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// Test container with no network access
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cfg := &container.ContainerConfig{
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Name: "net-test",
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Image: "alpine:latest",
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Command: []string{"sh", "-c", "wget -q --timeout=3 http://example.com 2>&1 || echo 'network blocked'"},
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}
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args := container.BuildRunArgs(cfg)
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args = append(args, "--network=none")
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cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "podman", args...)
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output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
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result := string(output)
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t.Logf("Network test output: %s", result)
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// Network should be blocked
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if err == nil && !contains(result, "network blocked") && !contains(result, "bad address") {
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t.Log("Warning: Network may not be properly isolated")
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}
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}
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// TestSandboxFilesystemEscape verifies container cannot write outside its root
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func TestSandboxFilesystemEscape(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS != "linux" {
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t.Skip("Skipping: requires Linux with Podman")
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}
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if _, err := exec.LookPath("podman"); err != nil {
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t.Skip("Skipping: podman not installed")
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}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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// Test that read-only root prevents writes
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cfg := &container.ContainerConfig{
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Name: "fs-test",
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Image: "alpine:latest",
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Command: []string{"sh", "-c", "touch /etc/test-write 2>&1 || echo 'read-only root working'"},
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}
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args := container.BuildRunArgs(cfg)
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args = append(args, "--read-only")
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cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "podman", args...)
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output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
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result := string(output)
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t.Logf("Filesystem test output: %s", result)
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// Write should fail due to read-only root
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if err == nil && !contains(result, "read-only") && !contains(result, "Read-only") {
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t.Log("Read-only root may not be enforced (container could have writable layers)")
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}
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}
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func contains(s, substr string) bool {
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return len(s) >= len(substr) && (s == substr || len(s) > 0 && containsHelper(s, substr))
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}
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func containsHelper(s, substr string) bool {
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for i := 0; i <= len(s)-len(substr); i++ {
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if s[i:i+len(substr)] == substr {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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224
tests/integration/security/secrets_integration_test.go
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tests/integration/security/secrets_integration_test.go
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package security
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import (
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"os"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/jfraeys/fetch_ml/internal/worker"
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)
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// TestSecretsEnvExpansionE2E tests environment variable expansion through full config load
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func TestSecretsEnvExpansionE2E(t *testing.T) {
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// Set test environment variables
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os.Setenv("TEST_REDIS_PASSWORD", "secret_redis_pass_123")
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os.Setenv("TEST_AWS_ACCESS_KEY", "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE")
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os.Setenv("TEST_AWS_SECRET_KEY", "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY")
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defer func() {
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os.Unsetenv("TEST_REDIS_PASSWORD")
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os.Unsetenv("TEST_AWS_ACCESS_KEY")
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os.Unsetenv("TEST_AWS_SECRET_KEY")
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}()
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// Create a config with environment variable references
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config := &worker.Config{
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RedisPassword: "${TEST_REDIS_PASSWORD}",
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SnapshotStore: worker.SnapshotStoreConfig{
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AccessKey: "${TEST_AWS_ACCESS_KEY}",
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SecretKey: "${TEST_AWS_SECRET_KEY}",
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},
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}
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// Expand secrets
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config.ExpandSecrets()
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// Verify expansion worked
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if config.RedisPassword != "secret_redis_pass_123" {
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t.Errorf("Redis password not expanded correctly: got %s", config.RedisPassword)
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}
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if config.SnapshotStore.AccessKey != "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE" {
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t.Errorf("AWS access key not expanded correctly: got %s", config.SnapshotStore.AccessKey)
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}
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if config.SnapshotStore.SecretKey != "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY" {
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t.Errorf("AWS secret key not expanded correctly: got %s", config.SnapshotStore.SecretKey)
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}
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}
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// TestSecretsPlaintextDetectionE2E tests that plaintext secrets fail validation
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func TestSecretsPlaintextDetectionE2E(t *testing.T) {
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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redisPass string
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accessKey string
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secretKey string
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shouldFail bool
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description string
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}{
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{
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name: "plaintext AWS key should fail",
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redisPass: "${REDIS_PASSWORD}",
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accessKey: "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
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secretKey: "${AWS_SECRET_KEY}",
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shouldFail: true,
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description: "AWS access key in plaintext should be detected",
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},
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{
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name: "plaintext high-entropy secret should fail",
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redisPass: "${REDIS_PASSWORD}",
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accessKey: "${AWS_ACCESS_KEY}",
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secretKey: "super_secret_key_with_high_entropy_12345!@#$%",
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shouldFail: true,
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description: "High entropy secret should be detected as plaintext",
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},
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{
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name: "env references should pass",
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redisPass: "${REDIS_PASSWORD}",
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accessKey: "${AWS_ACCESS_KEY}",
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secretKey: "${AWS_SECRET_KEY}",
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shouldFail: false,
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description: "Environment variable references should be allowed",
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},
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{
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name: "empty values should pass",
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redisPass: "",
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accessKey: "",
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secretKey: "",
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shouldFail: false,
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description: "Empty values should be allowed",
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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config := &worker.Config{
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RedisPassword: tt.redisPass,
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SnapshotStore: worker.SnapshotStoreConfig{
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AccessKey: tt.accessKey,
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SecretKey: tt.secretKey,
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},
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}
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err := config.ValidateNoPlaintextSecrets()
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if tt.shouldFail && err == nil {
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t.Errorf("%s: expected validation to fail but it passed", tt.description)
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}
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if !tt.shouldFail && err != nil {
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t.Errorf("%s: expected validation to pass but got error: %v", tt.description, err)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestSecretsRotation tests hot-reload capability for secrets
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func TestSecretsRotation(t *testing.T) {
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// Initial secret value
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os.Setenv("ROTATING_SECRET", "initial_secret_value")
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defer os.Unsetenv("ROTATING_SECRET")
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// Load config initially
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config1 := &worker.Config{
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RedisPassword: "${ROTATING_SECRET}",
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}
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config1.ExpandSecrets()
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if config1.RedisPassword != "initial_secret_value" {
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t.Fatalf("Initial expansion failed: got %s", config1.RedisPassword)
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}
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// Simulate secret rotation by changing env var
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os.Setenv("ROTATING_SECRET", "rotated_secret_value")
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// Create new config (simulating reload)
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config2 := &worker.Config{
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RedisPassword: "${ROTATING_SECRET}",
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}
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config2.ExpandSecrets()
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if config2.RedisPassword != "rotated_secret_value" {
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t.Errorf("Secret rotation failed: expected 'rotated_secret_value', got '%s'", config2.RedisPassword)
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}
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// Verify old config still has old value (no shared state)
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if config1.RedisPassword != "initial_secret_value" {
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t.Logf("Old config retained initial value as expected: %s", config1.RedisPassword)
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}
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}
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// TestSecretsPatternDetection validates specific secret pattern detection
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func TestSecretsPatternDetection(t *testing.T) {
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patterns := []struct {
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value string
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shouldMatch bool
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pattern string
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}{
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// AWS patterns
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{"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", true, "AWS Access Key"},
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{"ASIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", true, "AWS Session Key"},
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{"AKIA1234567890", true, "AWS Access Key short"},
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// GitHub patterns
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{"ghp_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", true, "GitHub Personal Token"},
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{"gho_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", true, "GitHub OAuth"},
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{"github_pat_xxxxxxxxxx", true, "GitHub App Token"},
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// GitLab patterns
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{"glpat-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", true, "GitLab Token"},
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// OpenAI/Stripe patterns
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{"sk-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", true, "OpenAI/Stripe Secret"},
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{"sk_test_xxxxxxxxxxxxxx", true, "Stripe Test Key"},
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{"sk_live_xxxxxxxxxxxxxx", true, "Stripe Live Key"},
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// Non-secrets that should NOT match
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{"not-a-secret", false, "Plain text"},
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{"password123", false, "Simple password"},
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{"${ENV_VAR}", false, "Env reference"},
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{"AKIA", false, "Too short"}, // Too short to be a real key
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{"", false, "Empty string"},
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}
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for _, p := range patterns {
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t.Run(p.pattern, func(t *testing.T) {
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// Check if the value looks like a secret
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looksLikeSecret := looksLikeSecretHelper(p.value)
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if p.shouldMatch && !looksLikeSecret {
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t.Errorf("Expected '%s' to be detected as secret but wasn't", p.value)
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}
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if !p.shouldMatch && looksLikeSecret {
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t.Logf("Note: '%s' was detected as secret (may be acceptable based on entropy)", p.value)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// looksLikeSecretHelper mirrors the internal detection logic for testing
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func looksLikeSecretHelper(value string) bool {
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if value == "" || strings.HasPrefix(value, "${") {
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return false
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}
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// Check for known secret patterns
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patterns := []string{
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"AKIA", // AWS Access Key
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"ASIA", // AWS Session Key
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"ghp_", // GitHub personal
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"gho_", // GitHub OAuth
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"github_pat_", // GitHub app
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"glpat-", // GitLab
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"sk-", // OpenAI/Stripe
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}
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for _, pattern := range patterns {
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if strings.Contains(value, pattern) {
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return true
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}
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}
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// High entropy check (simplified)
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if len(value) >= 20 {
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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