diff --git a/internal/api/audit/handlers.go b/internal/api/audit/handlers.go
index 4ccb1a1..8ceebe2 100644
--- a/internal/api/audit/handlers.go
+++ b/internal/api/audit/handlers.go
@@ -116,7 +116,9 @@ func (h *Handler) GetV1AuditEvents(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		}
 
 		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-		json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response)
+		if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response); err != nil {
+			h.logger.Warn("failed to encode audit events", "error", err)
+		}
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -129,7 +131,9 @@ func (h *Handler) GetV1AuditEvents(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response)
+	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response); err != nil {
+		h.logger.Warn("failed to encode empty audit events", "error", err)
+	}
 }
 
 // PostV1AuditVerify handles POST /v1/audit/verify
@@ -150,7 +154,9 @@ func (h *Handler) PostV1AuditVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(result)
+	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(result); err != nil {
+		h.logger.Warn("failed to encode verification result", "error", err)
+	}
 }
 
 // GetV1AuditChainRoot handles GET /v1/audit/chain-root
@@ -169,7 +175,9 @@ func (h *Handler) GetV1AuditChainRoot(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response)
+	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response); err != nil {
+		h.logger.Warn("failed to encode chain root", "error", err)
+	}
 }
 
 // checkPermission checks if the user has the required permission
diff --git a/internal/audit/audit.go b/internal/audit/audit.go
index 705df29..184ff23 100644
--- a/internal/audit/audit.go
+++ b/internal/audit/audit.go
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ func NewLoggerWithBase(enabled bool, filePath string, logger *logging.Logger, ba
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create audit directory: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// #nosec G304 -- fullPath is validated through validateAndSecurePath and checkFileNotSymlink
 	file, err := os.OpenFile(fullPath, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to open audit log file: %w", err)
@@ -121,7 +122,9 @@ func NewLoggerWithBase(enabled bool, filePath string, logger *logging.Logger, ba
 
 	// Restore chain state from existing log to prevent integrity break on restart
 	if err := al.resumeFromFile(); err != nil {
-		file.Close()
+		if closeErr := file.Close(); closeErr != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resume audit chain and close file: %w (close error: %v)", err, closeErr)
+		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resume audit chain: %w", err)
 	}
 
diff --git a/internal/audit/chain.go b/internal/audit/chain.go
index ee1ff8e..83dd309 100644
--- a/internal/audit/chain.go
+++ b/internal/audit/chain.go
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ func (hc *HashChain) AddEvent(event Event) (*ChainEntry, error) {
 
 // VerifyChain verifies the integrity of a chain from a file
 func VerifyChain(filePath string) error {
+	// #nosec G304 -- filePath is internally controlled, not from user input
 	file, err := os.Open(filePath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to open chain file: %w", err)
@@ -188,6 +189,7 @@ func openOrCreateChainFile(filePath string) (*os.File, uint64, string, error) {
 	// Check if file exists
 	if _, err := os.Stat(filePath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
 		// Create new file
+		// #nosec G304 -- filePath is internally controlled, not from user input
 		file, err := os.OpenFile(filePath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_APPEND, 0600)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, 0, "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create chain file: %w", err)
@@ -196,6 +198,7 @@ func openOrCreateChainFile(filePath string) (*os.File, uint64, string, error) {
 	}
 
 	// File exists - verify integrity and get last state
+	// #nosec G304 -- filePath is internally controlled, not from user input
 	file, err := os.OpenFile(filePath, os.O_RDONLY, 0600)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, 0, "", fmt.Errorf("failed to open existing chain file: %w", err)
@@ -208,16 +211,19 @@ func openOrCreateChainFile(filePath string) (*os.File, uint64, string, error) {
 	for decoder.More() {
 		var entry ChainEntry
 		if err := decoder.Decode(&entry); err != nil {
-			file.Close()
+			_ = file.Close()
 			return nil, 0, "", fmt.Errorf("corrupted chain file: %w", err)
 		}
 		lastSeq = entry.SeqNum
 		lastHash = entry.ThisHash
 	}
 
-	file.Close()
+	if err := file.Close(); err != nil {
+		return nil, 0, "", fmt.Errorf("failed to close chain file after read: %w", err)
+	}
 
 	// Reopen for appending
+	// #nosec G304 -- filePath is internally controlled, not from user input
 	file, err = os.OpenFile(filePath, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_APPEND, 0600)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, 0, "", fmt.Errorf("failed to reopen chain file for append: %w", err)
diff --git a/internal/audit/checkpoint.go b/internal/audit/checkpoint.go
index c0bbb9c..cc33a1c 100644
--- a/internal/audit/checkpoint.go
+++ b/internal/audit/checkpoint.go
@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ func (dcm *DBCheckpointManager) VerifyAgainstDB(filePath string) error {
 		return err
 	}
 
+	if localSeq < 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("sequence number cannot be negative: %d", localSeq)
+	}
 	if uint64(localSeq) != dbSeq || localHash != dbHash {
 		return fmt.Errorf(
 			"TAMPERING DETECTED: local(seq=%d hash=%s) vs db(seq=%d hash=%s)",
@@ -102,6 +105,9 @@ func (dcm *DBCheckpointManager) VerifyAllFiles() ([]VerificationResult, error) {
 		if err != nil {
 			result.Valid = false
 			result.Error = fmt.Sprintf("read local file: %v", err)
+		} else if localSeq < 0 {
+			result.Valid = false
+			result.Error = fmt.Sprintf("sequence number cannot be negative: %d", localSeq)
 		} else if uint64(localSeq) != dbSeq || localHash != dbHash {
 			result.Valid = false
 			result.FirstTampered = localSeq
diff --git a/internal/audit/rotation.go b/internal/audit/rotation.go
index bd8d439..5af10dc 100644
--- a/internal/audit/rotation.go
+++ b/internal/audit/rotation.go
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ func NewRotatingLogger(enabled bool, basePath, anchorDir string, logger *logging
 	}
 
 	// Open the log file for current date
+	// #nosec G304 -- fullPath is internally constructed from basePath and currentDate
 	file, err := os.OpenFile(fullPath, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("open audit log file: %w", err)
@@ -76,7 +77,9 @@ func NewRotatingLogger(enabled bool, basePath, anchorDir string, logger *logging
 
 	// Resume from file if it exists
 	if err := al.resumeFromFile(); err != nil {
-		file.Close()
+		if closeErr := file.Close(); closeErr != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("resume audit chain: %w, close: %v", err, closeErr)
+		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("resume audit chain: %w", err)
 	}
 
@@ -131,6 +134,9 @@ func (rl *RotatingLogger) Rotate() error {
 	}
 
 	// Create anchor file with last hash
+	if rl.sequenceNum < 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("sequence number cannot be negative: %d", rl.sequenceNum)
+	}
 	anchor := AnchorFile{
 		Date:     oldDate,
 		LastHash: rl.lastHash,
@@ -146,6 +152,7 @@ func (rl *RotatingLogger) Rotate() error {
 	rl.currentDate = time.Now().UTC().Format("2006-01-02")
 	newPath := filepath.Join(rl.basePath, fmt.Sprintf("audit-%s.log", rl.currentDate))
 
+	// #nosec G304 -- newPath is internally constructed from basePath and currentDate
 	f, err := os.OpenFile(newPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_APPEND, 0o600)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -202,6 +209,7 @@ func writeAnchorFile(path string, anchor AnchorFile) error {
 
 // readAnchorFile reads an anchor file from disk
 func readAnchorFile(path string) (*AnchorFile, error) {
+	// #nosec G304 -- path is an internally controlled anchor file path
 	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read anchor file: %w", err)
@@ -216,6 +224,7 @@ func readAnchorFile(path string) (*AnchorFile, error) {
 
 // sha256File computes the SHA256 hash of a file
 func sha256File(path string) (string, error) {
+	// #nosec G304 -- path is an internally controlled audit log file
 	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("read file: %w", err)
@@ -246,6 +255,9 @@ func VerifyRotationIntegrity(logPath, anchorPath string) error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	if lastSeq < 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("sequence number cannot be negative: %d", lastSeq)
+	}
 	if uint64(lastSeq) != anchor.LastSeq || lastHash != anchor.LastHash {
 		return fmt.Errorf("TAMPERING DETECTED: chain mismatch: expected(seq=%d,hash=%s), got(seq=%d,hash=%s)",
 			anchor.LastSeq, anchor.LastHash, lastSeq, lastHash)
@@ -256,6 +268,7 @@ func VerifyRotationIntegrity(logPath, anchorPath string) error {
 
 // getLastEventFromFile returns the last event's sequence and hash from a file
 func getLastEventFromFile(path string) (int64, string, error) {
+	// #nosec G304 -- path is an internally controlled audit log file
 	file, err := os.Open(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, "", err
diff --git a/internal/audit/sealed.go b/internal/audit/sealed.go
index d533a7b..0b42fd7 100644
--- a/internal/audit/sealed.go
+++ b/internal/audit/sealed.go
@@ -62,13 +62,17 @@ func (ssm *SealedStateManager) Checkpoint(seq uint64, hash string) error {
 	}
 
 	if _, err := f.Write(append(data, '\n')); err != nil {
-		f.Close()
+		if errClose := f.Close(); errClose != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("write chain entry: %w, close: %v", err, errClose)
+		}
 		return fmt.Errorf("write chain entry: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	// CRITICAL: fsync chain before returning — crash safety
 	if err := f.Sync(); err != nil {
-		f.Close()
+		if errClose := f.Close(); errClose != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("sync sealed chain: %w, close: %v", err, errClose)
+		}
 		return fmt.Errorf("sync sealed chain: %w", err)
 	}
 
diff --git a/internal/audit/verifier.go b/internal/audit/verifier.go
index 7479baa..26edb29 100644
--- a/internal/audit/verifier.go
+++ b/internal/audit/verifier.go
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ func (cv *ChainVerifier) VerifyLogFile(logPath string) (*VerificationResult, err
 	}
 
 	// Open the log file
+	// #nosec G304 -- logPath is an audit log path, not arbitrary user input
 	file, err := os.Open(logPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ func (cv *ChainVerifier) VerifyAndAlert(logPath string) (bool, error) {
 // GetChainRootHash returns the hash of the last event in the chain
 // This can be published to an external append-only store for independent verification
 func (cv *ChainVerifier) GetChainRootHash(logPath string) (string, error) {
+	// #nosec G304 -- logPath is an audit log path, not arbitrary user input
 	file, err := os.Open(logPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
diff --git a/internal/middleware/audit.go b/internal/middleware/audit.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..146b67c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/middleware/audit.go
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+// Package middleware provides HTTP middleware including audit logging
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/jfraeys/fetch_ml/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/jfraeys/fetch_ml/internal/logging"
+	"github.com/jfraeys/fetch_ml/internal/storage"
+)
+
+// Middleware provides audit logging for task access
+type Middleware struct {
+	db     *storage.DB
+	logger *logging.Logger
+}
+
+// NewMiddleware creates a new audit logging middleware
+func NewMiddleware(db *storage.DB, logger *logging.Logger) *Middleware {
+	return &Middleware{
+		db:     db,
+		logger: logger,
+	}
+}
+
+// Logger returns an HTTP middleware that logs task access to the audit log.
+// It should be applied to routes that access tasks (view, clone, execute, modify).
+func (m *Middleware) Logger(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		// Extract task ID from URL path if present
+		taskID := extractTaskID(r.URL.Path)
+		if taskID == "" {
+			// No task ID in path, skip audit logging
+			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+			return
+		}
+
+		// Determine action based on HTTP method and path
+		action := determineAction(r.Method, r.URL.Path)
+
+		// Get user or token
+		var userID, token *string
+		user := auth.GetUserFromContext(r.Context())
+		if user != nil {
+			u := user.Name
+			userID = &u
+		} else {
+			// Check for token in query params
+			t := r.URL.Query().Get("token")
+			if t != "" {
+				token = &t
+			}
+		}
+
+		// Get IP address
+		ipStr := getClientIP(r)
+		ip := &ipStr
+
+		// Log the access
+		if err := m.db.LogTaskAccess(taskID, userID, token, &action, ip); err != nil {
+			m.logger.Error("failed to log task access", "error", err, "task_id", taskID)
+			// Don't fail the request, just log the error
+		}
+
+		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	})
+}
+
+// extractTaskID extracts task ID from URL path patterns like:
+// /api/tasks/{id}
+// /api/tasks/{id}/clone
+// /api/tasks/{id}/execute
+func extractTaskID(path string) string {
+	// Remove query string if present
+	if idx := strings.Index(path, "?"); idx != -1 {
+		path = path[:idx]
+	}
+
+	// Check for task patterns
+	if !strings.Contains(path, "/tasks/") {
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	parts := strings.Split(path, "/")
+	for i, part := range parts {
+		if part == "tasks" && i+1 < len(parts) {
+			taskID := parts[i+1]
+			// Validate it's not a sub-path like "tasks" or "all"
+			if taskID != "" && taskID != "all" && taskID != "list" {
+				return taskID
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return ""
+}
+
+// determineAction maps HTTP method and path to audit action.
+func determineAction(method, path string) string {
+	lowerPath := strings.ToLower(path)
+
+	switch method {
+	case http.MethodGet:
+		if strings.Contains(lowerPath, "/clone") {
+			return "clone"
+		}
+		return "view"
+	case http.MethodPost, http.MethodPut, http.MethodPatch:
+		if strings.Contains(lowerPath, "/execute") || strings.Contains(lowerPath, "/run") {
+			return "execute"
+		}
+		return "modify"
+	case http.MethodDelete:
+		return "delete"
+	default:
+		return "view"
+	}
+}
+
+// RetentionJob runs the nightly audit log retention cleanup.
+// It deletes audit log entries older than the configured retention period.
+type RetentionJob struct {
+	db            *storage.DB
+	logger        *logging.Logger
+	retentionDays int
+}
+
+// NewRetentionJob creates a new retention job.
+// Default retention is 2 years (730 days) if not specified.
+func NewRetentionJob(db *storage.DB, logger *logging.Logger, retentionDays int) *RetentionJob {
+	if retentionDays <= 0 {
+		retentionDays = 730 // 2 years default
+	}
+	return &RetentionJob{
+		db:            db,
+		logger:        logger,
+		retentionDays: retentionDays,
+	}
+}
+
+// Run executes the retention cleanup once.
+func (j *RetentionJob) Run() error {
+	j.logger.Info("starting audit log retention cleanup", "retention_days", j.retentionDays)
+
+	deleted, err := j.db.DeleteOldAuditLogs(j.retentionDays)
+	if err != nil {
+		j.logger.Error("audit log retention cleanup failed", "error", err)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	j.logger.Info("audit log retention cleanup completed", "deleted_entries", deleted)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// RunPeriodic runs the retention job at the specified interval.
+// This should be called in a goroutine at application startup.
+func (j *RetentionJob) RunPeriodic(interval time.Duration, stopCh <-chan struct{}) {
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+
+	// Run immediately on startup
+	if err := j.Run(); err != nil {
+		j.logger.Error("initial audit log retention cleanup failed", "error", err)
+	}
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			if err := j.Run(); err != nil {
+				j.logger.Error("periodic audit log retention cleanup failed", "error", err)
+			}
+		case <-stopCh:
+			j.logger.Info("stopping audit log retention job")
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// StartNightlyRetentionJob starts a retention job that runs once per day at midnight UTC.
+func StartNightlyRetentionJob(db *storage.DB, logger *logging.Logger, retentionDays int, stopCh <-chan struct{}) {
+	job := NewRetentionJob(db, logger, retentionDays)
+
+	// Calculate time until next midnight UTC
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	nextMidnight := time.Date(now.Year(), now.Month(), now.Day()+1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	durationUntilMidnight := nextMidnight.Sub(now)
+
+	logger.Info("scheduling nightly audit log retention job",
+		"next_run", nextMidnight.Format(time.RFC3339),
+		"retention_days", retentionDays,
+	)
+
+	// Wait until midnight, then start the periodic ticker
+	go func() {
+		time.Sleep(durationUntilMidnight)
+		job.RunPeriodic(24*time.Hour, stopCh)
+	}()
+}